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ABSTRACT 
With the rapid advances in the capabilities of telehealth devices and their increasing 
connection to the Internet, security is becoming an issue of major concern. Therefore, the 
perceptions of the healthcare professional regarding security are of interest, as the 
patients trust them to make informed decisions on issues concerning their privacy, data 
and health. Eight healthcare professionals were interviewed to determine their perceptions 
and knowledge of security in healthcare. The research further examines one specific 
aspect of security which was considered of significant concern; the authenticity of a device 
being from the actual manufacturer and not a counterfeit. This research proposes device 
registration together with digital signatures and One-time Passwords (OTP) to address the 
issue of counterfeit remote patient monitoring devices and identify and authenticate the 
user of the device.  
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1. INTRODUCTION  
Perception is the subjective human understanding of a topic and will determine how an 
individual will respond to a specific issue. Understanding perception is critical to 
understanding and determining the behaviour of an individual and can be used to predict 
how they might interact with a system 1 
 
Security is becoming a sensitive topic, especially with recent advances in the technology 
used in telehealth. Patients trust healthcare professionals to maintain their privacy, 
confidentiality and health; therefore, it is important to have mechanisms in place that can 
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protect the privacy of a patient 2. However, such mechanisms generally need to be 
proactive on behalf of the organisation and users that care for the data. This research 
therefore investigates the perception of healthcare professionals towards security and 
their knowledge of the threats in information security. It further investigates one approach 
to address the issue of counterfeit remote patient monitoring devices. 
 
This study was undertaken in selected hospitals and a health care centre in London, U.K. 
that are actively practicing telehealth. 
Information security may be considered to have three main aspects; 
1. Confidentiality – which is the prevention of unlawful revelation of information;  
2. Integrity - which is the prevention of unlawful alteration of information;  
3. Availability - which is the prevention of unlawful withholding of information or 
resources 3 
 
1.2 Terminologies 
 Information Security in Healthcare sector - Protection of personal health related 
devices and records from any unauthorized access, modification, disclosure or 
use 4. 
 Medical identity theft - The illegal access and use of personally identifiable 
information to obtain medical service, prescription drugs, or medical insurance 
coverage by fraud. It includes medical insurance numbers, medical care numbers, 
or patient or physician identification numbers that may be used directly or sold on 
the black market 5. Stolen medical identities are most frequently used to obtain 
addictive prescription medications. 
 Personal Health Device (PHD) - A device used directly by the patient to obtain 
clinical observations. This includes devices such as, weighing scales, blood 
pressure monitors, blood glucose monitors etc. 
1.3 Objective of the Research 
The term healthcare professional has been used in this study to describe doctors and 
nurses. 
Counterfeit can be defined as made in exact imitation or forgery with intent to deceive or 
defraud. 
The objectives of this study are to determine the perception of healthcare professionals on 
information security and to address the issue of counterfeit remote patient monitoring 
devices to include: 
 What is the level of perception held by healthcare professionals? 
 What factors influence the perception of healthcare professionals? 
 What is the level of awareness of healthcare professionals of security in their 
working environment? 
 What are the implications of a breach of security and how would it affect them and 
their patients? 
 What are the risks involved in the misidentification of patients in remote patient 
monitoring?  
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 What are appropriate identification techniques for frail elderly using Personal 
Health Devices (PHD)? 
 How can devices be authenticated to ensure genuine manufacture and not 
counterfeit? 
1.4 Research Significance 
Although security in healthcare is a popular topic for research, no articles have been 
published on the perception and knowledge of healthcare professionals on information 
security in the healthcare environment, despite security being paramount for managing 
personal information.   
 
Telehealth has probably suffered as security does always receive the attention that is 
required during the development stages of a technology, and this deficiency could leave 
telehealth vulnerable to malicious attacks. 
 
Problems include patient identification, incorrect readings and counterfeit (inaccurate) 
devices; each of which can put the life of a patient at risk 6. 
Telehealth research shows that one of the main gaps in RPM architecture research is that 
the issue of security is not considered, because the researchers are not familiar with it 7.  
These findings suggest that telehealth and RPM devices could provide a perfect playing 
field for opportunistic security attacks. In addition, the current RPM devices are limited in 
terms of the number of users that can use each device at a given time and only the 
person who is being monitored is allowed to use the device 8; 9. 
 
The problem of patient identification relates to the ability to verify the person using the 
device is the actual patient. Problems frequently arise from visitors inadvertently using the 
device and causing incorrect data to be recorded. Additionally, patients may persuade 
others to take a reading on their behalf.  
 
Incorrect readings arise from a patient not following a prescribed protocol. This can 
include: not taking measurements at the same time of the day; repeatedly taking a 
measurement; taking measurements under different circumstance, such as wearing 
different amounts of clothing when taking a weight; not taking sufficient care during a 
measurement, such as holding a pet; and incorrect procedure. 
 
Counterfeit medical devices pose a threat as they are often not manufactured to the 
required standard of accuracy as the original device and their use will result in inaccurate 
readings. 
Research has identified cases where misidentification of a device has led to the device 
not being recognized and putting the health of the patient at risk 10. For example, it took 
two weeks to find 30 patients affected by a recent recall of patients following a hip 
replacement. The problem is often exacerbated by manufacturers using different coding 
schemes to identify products and their unique serial number, making it difficult to trace 
device to patient 10. 
In healthcare, diseases such as diabetes rely on accurate measurements for treatment, if 
a device is lost or is replaced with a rogue or compromised device and then introduced 
into the ecosystem there are high chances of it sending the wrong reading, which will 
trigger the wrong treatment that might endanger the patients’ life 11. 
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2. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
2.1 Design of the study 
Semi-structured interviews were used in this research to elicit the perceptions of the 
healthcare professionals towards information security and security issues in telehealth. 
Ten questions were prepared in advance to direct conversion on the two most salient 
topics of the study; security in general and security of remote patient monitoring devices. 
The rationale for using a qualitative approach in this study was to explore and describe 
the opinion of healthcare professionals’ general perception of security. A qualitative 
approach was appropriate to capture the opinions of healthcare professionals regarding 
security. 
This is descriptive research as it looks the general perception of healthcare professionals 
on security with a view to improve security practices and awareness. 
 
2.2 Study area 
The study was conducted in 4 London healthcare settings, including three hospitals 
(Ealing Hospital, Royal Free Hospital and Hillingdon Hospital) and one healthcare centre, 
(Chorleywood Health Centre). Eight healthcare professionals were interviewed over the 
period from January 2014 to February 2014.  
 
2.3 Sampling techniques and sample size 
Participants were taken from healthcare organisations that were practicing telehealth and 
the participant identified as being actively engaged in telehealth. Interviews were 
conducted with the healthcare professional in their respective organisation.  
 
2.4 Ethics and consent 
The study received ethics approval from Brunel University Ethics Committee. The 
objective of the research was explained to each participant and consent was obtained 
prior to starting the interview. 
 
2.5 Data collection instrument and method 
All interviews were digitally recorded and later transcribed. Thematic analysis was used 
on the data in order to identify the important themes and to understand the significance of 
the themes identified in advance from the literature survey. 
 
3. Results 
 
3.1 Demographics 
Table I provides the demographics of the participants of the study. The data 
includes gender and the number of participants. 
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Age Gender Participants 
 
18-30 
M 1 
F 2 
31-45 M 1 
F 3 
>45 M 1 
F 0 
Total 8 
 
 
3.2. Responses 
 
Question 1 - access to email and internet 
Question 1 related to access to email and the internet. All the participants confirmed that 
they had an email account. However, the frequency and the length of time spent on the 
internet varied. Age was a major factor. Participants under 40 years old accessed the 
internet more often and used social networks. Respondents over 40 years used the 
internet less often, with two of them only using it for work purposes. Two used it for both 
work and personal use. 
 
Question 2 – email intrusion 
Question 2 asked if the participants had ever had their email account compromised by a 
hacker. The aim of this question was to determine if they had encountered a security 
issue and if they were aware of its nature. Six participants believed that they had had their 
accounts compromised by hackers, either their account had become inaccessible or they 
were told their passwords were changed.  
 
Question 3 – passwords 
Question 3 investigated perception of passwords. The aim of this question was to 
determine if the participants were aware that passwords can be guessed or discovered by 
brute force and the dangers of having passwords that are easily guessed. Three of the 
participants believed them to be secure. Five commented that they had a problem to 
remember passwords, especially if they were told to change their passwords often. One 
nurse informed that she had used “password” as her password.  
 
Question 4 – computer virus 
TTable 1 demographics 
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Question 4 asked about computer viruses. Only one doctor and one nurse correctly 
described a computer virus as a malicious program. The remainder of the participants 
were unaware of what a computer virus was. 
 
Question 5 – security of passwords 
Question 5 asked further about the perception of the security of passwords. Four 
participants believed passwords to be secure, two that they could be insecure, and two 
answered that they did not know. A follow up question asked about the significance of 
having a password with many characters. Two answered that it gave protection against 
hackers, but six answered that they did not know the reason. 
 
Question 6 - information security 
Question 6 investigated the level of knowledge of the participants regarding the nature of 
Information security. Two participants indicated that they had some knowledge of 
information security, but six of the participants admitted to having little or no knowledge.  
 
Question 7 – security of storage systems 
Question 7 investigated the level of trust that each participant had in their current system 
for storing health records. All the participants believed that their system was secure. A 
follow up question asked how they knew that it was secure. All the participants responded 
that they had been informed by the NHS that it was secure but had been given no 
information on the details of how it was secure 
 
Question 8 – security of patient records 
Question 8 related to the security of the storage of patient records. Four doctors said they 
were unaware of the location of patient records as the nurses brought the records to them 
whenever a patient was visiting the hospital. Four nurses described how some records 
were stored online in a database but paper records were stored in the hospital. A follow 
up question asked about the access control mechanisms to the records. The nurses 
responded that “the only form of access control is lock and key so nurses and cleaners 
have access to the storage area of the records”. 
 
Question 9 – remote patient monitoring 
Question 9 related to the security of remote patient monitoring devices. The aim of this 
question was to determine the security of the devices and the dangers that can be 
associated with misidentification of patients. The participants were asked how they knew 
the identity of person sending observations. All the participants explained that each device 
has a unique identifier that is used to identify the patient that is using the device. A follow 
up question asked how they could verify the identity of the person using the device. All the 
respondents replied that they could not know because the devices had no means of 
identification or authentication of a patient.  
 
Question 10 – device authentication 
Question 10 investigated device authentication how it may be determined if a remote 
patient monitoring device was genuine or counterfeit. None of the respondents could 
answer this question. All the participants were aware of counterfeit products, but were 
unaware how to recognise a counterfeit device. One doctor answered, “If it’s packaged 
like the original one and looks like an original one how would one know?”  
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It was pointed out that the problem of device authentication is not limited to telehealth but 
affects the entire healthcare industry. 
 
4. Device authentication and patient verification 
This study has identified specific security issues that need to be resolved if they are not to 
be a threat to the implementation of telehealth. This includes counterfeit remote patient 
monitoring devices and the identification and verification of the actual patient making 
observations. One-time Passwords (OTP) and Digital signatures are proposed and 
investigated as a solution for device authentication. The proposed model is tested to 
evaluate its effectiveness and usability. 
This study examines ISO/IEEE 11073 which is a standard for Personal Health Device 
(PHD) and addresses security and authentication of telehealth devices which is critical in 
determining the integrity of a telehealth system. 
 
4.1 Device registration with OTP and digital signatures 
4.1.1 OTP 
A One-time Password (OTP) is defined as a password that has validity for one session 
only. Each new session requires that a new OTP is obtained. OTP have the advantage 
that they cannot be attacked by guessing or brute force, can be created to be random and 
of sufficient length to be secure, and not physically open to access. Access 
implementation with OTP may also incorporate authentication by a secret known only to 
the person 12. 
 
4.2.2 Digital Signature 
A digital signature can be defined as a mathematical scheme that is capable of 
demonstrating authentication, integrity and non-repudiation of a message. The validity of a 
digital signature provides proof to the recipient that: a received message was created by 
the disclosed sender (authentication); the sender cannot deny having sent the message 
(non-repudiation); and that the received message was not altered in transit 13. 
 
4.2.3 Device Registration  
When a patient first receives a remote patient monitoring device they register it with a 
service by providing their identification details and the unique product identifier of the 
device. During the registration process, a challenge response OTP authentication code is 
sent to the patient using a validated message address, such as email. Each authentication 
code is tamper proof and cannot be forged. On receiving the token, the patient can make 
a request to determine if the device is genuine. 
 
A simulation of the environment was created and tested. Figure I shows the proposed 
framework model and the information flow between a patient monitoring device and the 
service. 
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Figure I Device Authentication using OTP and digital signatures 
 
 
 
When the patient receives the authentication code, this means they are ready to register 
the device status. In the simulation the user was asked to log in via a secure web browser. 
The patient enters their registration details and registers their device. To be authenticated 
(1), the patient submits the same username to the authentication server as used during 
log in (2). The authentication server responds by issuing a challenge which is an 
authentication code sent to their email address (3). The patient retrieves the email with the 
OTP and then sends the OTP, date and time requested, and previous attributes signed 
with the private key of the patient as response (4).  The authentication server checks the 
response of the OTP (5) and if successful, will submit the request Id, message, date and 
time, hash, username and signature to the registration server (6). The registration server 
will check the OTP and also compare the hash value with the signature (7). If the OTP, 
the hash value and the signature match, the registration server will respond by 
authenticating the device. If not, the registration server will issue a message that the 
device is not valid. If a device is authenticated, details about the device (e.g. 
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manufactured date, name of the device) will be displayed and an audit log containing the 
request and the digital signature will be submitted to the request log. 
 
For each request, a secure hash (SHA-1) is generated against the attributes (date and 
time, Request ID, Username, and Request message) and then digitally signed. Sending 
the request attributes and its digital signature will further ensure that the request cannot 
be altered. 
 
If there is a dispute over the authenticity of a request, this can be resolved by examination 
of the signed confirmation using the public key of the patient. Figure II shows a log of 
signed information that could be used to resolve a case of repudiation for a registered and 
authenticated device.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure II device authentication 
 
 
 
 
4.2 Users Mailbox 
The OTP is randomly generated and can only be used once during authentication. 
In Figure III the user logs into the mailbox that they used during registration to retrieve the 
OTP that was sent to them. The OTP is used in the process of RPM authentication. 
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Figure III OTP sent to the mailbox of the patient 
 
 
 
4.3 Patient Identification 
Lack of a proper identification technique in PHD monitoring devices can lead to 
verification problems. If a patient cannot be properly verified they may not receive correct 
care, or worse may receive incorrect care. 
 
This study recognises the importance of having a proper identification. However, 
telehealth technology should be easy to use, as it is used extensively by the frail elderly. 
Any solution should be designed for the frail elderly, but also needs to remain cost 
effective. 
 
Many conflicting factors need to be considered in selecting an identification technique that 
can be used by the frail elderly on Personal Health Devices (PHD). 
 
NFC technology is proposed as a solution to the problem of identification of a patient 
using a PHD device. Presentation of a card, or similar, to the device in advance of a 
measurement can validate and identify the user. Work is being undertaken to evaluate the 
approach by modifying a blood pressure monitor to incorporate identification and 
verification by using NFC technology. 
Why NFC technology 
Near field communication (NFC) is a set of communication protocols that allow two 
electronic devices, one of which is usually a portable device such as a smartphone, to 
start communication by bringing them within 4 cm of each other. 
The following criteria were used in selecting NFC 14: 
1. Usability 
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Usability plays a vital role in technology for old people; it builds confidence and trust when 
using technology. 
Patients should not have to think too hard when they are using a technology, nor should 
they have to refer to a manual when using it; this makes them look less intelligent and 
leads to time wastage. 
Device prompts should be logical, sequential and effortless to ensure that the patient uses 
less time, enjoys using the device, makes a recommendation and looks forward to using it 
continuously. NFC technology provides an effortless and fast means of identification and 
authentication.  
2. Familiarity 
NFC technology is widely used in Great Britain and other developed countries. In London 
people are using it for public transport as part of the Transport for London (TFL) network 
and in making payments at the grocery stores. This study identified that NFC technology 
will elicit different reactions, with most of them positive due to ease of use and very few 
negatives for those who are not familiar with the technology. 
3. Cost 
Cost plays a vital role in implementation of any technology. NFC technology is affordable 
and secure; an NFC card cost less than 40p and can be re-used multiple times by 
different users, which makes them economically viable. 
 
 
  
 Identification with NFC alone is not sufficient; therefore, there is a need for a solution that 
will increase the security within the NFC framework. This study proposes the use of a 
capability based system because, NFC_ID can be tampered with while in storage or while 
in use 15.  
It provides additional security by restricting access to data, people and devices. 
Capabilities are therefore especially applicable in the context of eHealth as health data is 
very sensitive and hence must be protected from tampering and unauthorised access. 
Furthermore, capabilities allow us to run a role-based mechanism so restrictions can be 
based on the role of different people within the healthcare system such as doctors, 
nurses, technicians and administrators.  Therefore, in this system each entity must have a 
capability for example people, devices and infrastructure all must have capabilities. 
Capabilities can also be used to provide restrictions to access to data and resources to 
personnel based their roles. Figure IV present the new format that will be used to present 
capabilities.  More details on this capability format is found in 15. 
 
Figure IV. The new capability format. 
 
 
The Type Field: This field is used to specify the type of object capability that is being used. 
Types could include Cloud Providers, Cloud platforms, users, applications, etc. 
The Property Field: This field is used to define the properties of the object 
The Object Id: This field is used to uniquely identify the object.  
The Random Bit Field: This field helps to uniquely identify the object. 
The Hash Field: The Hash field is used to prevent the casual tampering of capabilities. 
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To enhance patients’ privacy this study proposes the use of user authentication schemes 
for protection of patients’ privacy and common security attacks 16, 17. 
 
 
  
5. CONCLUSION 
The aim of this study was to determine the level of perception and knowledge of security 
among healthcare professionals. The outcome of this study indicates that the perception 
of healthcare professionals towards the importance of security is very low and their 
knowledge about security issues is poor. Such poor awareness of security amongst the 
users poses significant danger for the integrity of healthcare systems. This is especially 
important when adopting new technologies before all the threats are recognised and 
mitigated. Telehealth, still being in its early stages of development, leaves it vulnerable to 
security attacks. Such threats in security could undermine confidence in its full 
implementation, and so it is very important that healthcare professionals are made aware 
of the security issues. 
 
This study further identified specific threats to the implementation of telehealth. These 
include counterfeit remote patient monitoring devices and the identification and verification 
of the actual patient making observations. Digital signatures and OTP were proposed and 
investigated as a solution for device authentication and certify that the devices are 
genuine. Each device is bound to the patient that registered the device, and so the 
hospital can ensure that the devices are registered - any counterfeit device will not be 
authenticated and therefore will not be allowed to be used. 
 
The study highlights the importance of patient identification in home monitoring devices. 
WHO (2011) state that failure to correctly identify patients can result in wrong diagnosis, 
transfusion errors and testing errors. The USA is trying to make patient identification one 
of its patient safety goals and so reduce errors caused by patient misidentification 18. 
There are a limited number of healthcare professionals actively engaged in telehealth in 
the locality and available for interview. Furthermore, a significant number of those 
approached declined to participate in the study. These limitations resulted in only 8 
participants agreeing to participate. 
 
The approaches and results of this research can be used in the evaluation of security 
practices in the healthcare setting, and proposing best security practices in healthcare. 
This research recommends creating awareness workshops that can be used to educate 
clinicians about the importance of security in the health care setting. Moreover, health 
care professionals need to be trained on Security standards 95/46 EC and ISO 27002 that 
emphasize security practices and the importance of enforcing these standards within their 
practices 19, 20. 
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